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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To examine use of a novel telephone and
Internet service—the National Pandemic Flu Service
(NPFS)—by the population of England during the
2009–2010 influenza pandemic.
Setting: National telephone and Internet-based
service.
Participants: Service available to population of
England (n=51.8 million).
Primary and secondary outcome measures:
Primary: service use rate, by week. Numbers and age-
specific and sex-specific rates of population who:
accessed service; were authorised to collect antiviral
medication; collected antiviral medication; were advised
to seek further face-to-face assessment. Secondary:
daily mean contacts by hour; proportion using service
by telephone/Internet.
Results: The NPFS was activated on 23 July 2009,
operated for 204 days and assessed 2.7 million
patients (5200 consultations/100 000 population). This
was six times the number of people who consulted
their general practitioner with influenza-like illness
during the same period (823 consultations/100 000
population, rate ratio (RR)=6.30, 95% CI 6.28 to 6.32).
Women used the service more than men (52.6 vs 43.4
assessments/1000 population, RR1 21, 95% CI 1.21
to 1.22). Among adults, use of the service declined
with age (16–29 years: 74.4 vs 65 years+: 9.9
assessments/1000 population (RR 7.46 95% CI 7.41
to 7.52). Almost three-quarters of those assessed met
the criteria to receive antiviral medication (1 807 866/
2 488 510; 72.6%). Most of the people subsequently
collected this medication, although more than one-
third did not (n=646 709; 35.8%). Just over one-third
of those assessed were advised to seek further face-to-
face assessment with a practitioner (951 332/
2 488 504; 38.2%).
Conclusions: This innovative healthcare service
operated at large scale and achieved its aim of
relieving considerable pressure from mainstream
health services, while providing appropriate initial
assessment and management for patients. This
offers proof-of-concept for such a service that, with
further refinement, England can use in future
pandemics. Other countries may wish to adopt a
similar system as part of their pandemic emergency
planning.
INTRODUCTION
England started planning for the emergence
of a new inﬂuenza virus with pandemic
potential following a warning by the Chief
Medical Ofﬁcer in 2002 about the risks of
being unprepared.1 The plan foresaw that
widespread infection would cause a surge in
demand for primary care and hospital ser-
vices that could quickly overwhelm them.
Planning, therefore, focused on a new way of
providing ﬁrst response to patients with
inﬂuenza-like illness (ILI) during a pan-
demic. The concept involved telephone call
centres and the Internet and evaluation of
symptoms, provision of advice and authorisa-
tion of antiviral medication in appropriate
clinical circumstances. This was to be the
ﬁrst time in the UK that patients would be
assessed and given a prescription medication
without being seen by a doctor or nurse.2
The system was intended to keep general
practitioners free to see patients who devel-
oped serious illness as a result of inﬂuenza
infection, but to continue also managing
their normal caseload.
On 11 June 2009, the WHO formally
declared the ﬁrst inﬂuenza pandemic for
40 years.3 The virus had ﬁrst emerged in
Mexico in March 2009. By May of that year it
had spread worldwide. The ﬁrst case in the
UK occurred in Scotland in late April, and
was followed shortly by the ﬁrst cases in
England.4 5 The UK response was charac-
terised by two phases—an initial
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Complete data ascertainment from the 2.7
million people who used the National Pandemic
Flu Service.
▪ Data were self-reported, without clinical valid-
ation or follow-up.
▪ Comparisons with GP consultation data illustrate
how healthcare-seeking behaviour during the
pandemic differed by age and sex.
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containment response from May to June 2009 and a sub-
sequent mitigation (or ‘treatment-only’) phase.6 The
containment phase involved a proactive response, with
the aim of limiting and delaying the virus’ spread. It
included school closures, early treatment of suspected
cases based on clinical criteria and contact tracing to
provide prophylaxis to close contacts of cases. The inci-
dence of inﬂuenza began to rise in mid-June. By July
2009, ILI was putting great pressure on the country’s
National Health Service (NHS), particularly general
practice (GP), which in England provides the majority
of front-line primary care. In response, the government
activated its emergency plan to establish this national
telephone and Internet-based service.
We report on the experience with this novel service
for assessment and treatment of pandemic inﬂuenza,
and the way that it was used by the public.
CONTEXT: THE NATIONAL PANDEMIC FLU SERVICE
The service, ﬁrst activated on 23 July 2009 during the
mitigation phase of the public health response, was
named the National Pandemic Flu Service (NPFS). Any
member of the public with ‘ﬂu-like’ symptoms could
access it by telephone or on the Internet (Internet users
answering a series of questions on-screen). Telephone
users were asked the same questions by a call centre
operative.
Each assessment consisted of a set of yes/no questions.
Via a standard algorithm, the responses to these ques-
tions determined the advice given to each patient and
whether or not a course of antiviral medication was
authorised for the patient. Each patient passed through
an assessment of up to three stages (see ﬁgure 1).
The ﬁrst stage was a preassessment screen, to redirect
patients in need of urgent personal medical attention.
Patients reporting features such as unconsciousness, sei-
zures or meningococcal-like rash were told to call an
emergency ambulance rather than continue using the
service. Patients who had recently returned from a mal-
arial region were directed to see their general practi-
tioner urgently instead of using the service, as were all
children under 1 year and pregnant women with a
history of respiratory disease. All other patients entered
the second stage of the assessment.
The second stage identiﬁed whether the patient had
the classic symptoms of inﬂuenza. The question asked
was: “Does the patient have a high temperature and at
least two of the following symptoms?—Widespread
muscle and joint aches, a cough, headache, blocked or
runny nose, sore throat, vomiting, watery diarrhea,
cannot stop crying (only children)”. Those who
answered ‘yes’ progressed to the third stage of the assess-
ment. The remainder were informed that they were
unlikely to have inﬂuenza and their contact with the
service ended, with advice being given.
Patients arriving at the third assessment stage were,
therefore, those identiﬁed as having ILI. In this third
stage, further information was collected on four factors:
how long they had been symptomatic; whether antivirals
had already been taken; risk factors predisposing to
severe illness (such as chronic lung disease and immu-
nocompromise) and symptoms suggestive of severe
illness (cough productive of yellow, green, brown or
bloody phlegm; uncharacteristic behaviour change;
pleuritic chest pain; respiratory distress; drowsiness).
Those who had been ill for more than a week were also
asked whether they had non-‘ﬂu-like’ symptoms of acute
illness (eg, persistent vomiting or severe earache).
The answers given in the third stage determined
whether or not the patient was given an authorisation
number to obtain a course of antiviral medication. The
answers also determined what advice was given to the
patient, including whether or not they were also advised to
contact another healthcare service—usually their general
practitioner, but sometimes a midwife (if pregnant) or a
renal specialist (those with pre-existing renal disease).
A network of antiviral distribution centres was estab-
lished around England, in locations such as community
centres, sports centres and pharmacies. Any assessed
patient who required antiviral medication was asked to
ﬁnd a ‘ﬂu friend’ (a relative, friend or neighbour) to
collect this on their behalf from a distribution centre,
using the authorisation number provided by the service.
Collection by a third party was intended to reduce the
spread of infection at crowded distribution points.
The algorithm had been developed as part of pan-
demic planning, and was reﬁned when clinical informa-
tion about the inﬂuenza A (H1N1) pdm09 virus was
available. The algorithm was developed and reﬁned by a
group involving clinical experts from a range of organi-
sations, including the Health Protection Agency and the
Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP), based
on their clinical experience and review of the available
evidence. Legally classiﬁed as a ‘medical device’, the
algorithm underwent fast-track regulatory approval by
the Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory Authority.
The Department of Health commissioned the RCGP to
assure the quality of the system. General practitioner
liaison advisers, coordinated by the RCGP, were based in
the service’s call centres.
Throughout the service’s operation, the algorithm
was kept under review by the clinical subgroup of the
Department of Health’s Pandemic Inﬂuenza Clinical
and Operational Group. Reﬁnements to the algorithm
were introduced to improve safety and to minimise dis-
ruption to other services. These reﬁnements were
made based on the service’s evolving experience and
emerging information about the pandemic. During
the service’s operation, the Department of Health
monitored reports of clinical incidents from a number
of sources including the National Patient Safety
Agency (NPSA); the call centre-based GP advisers;
Strategic Health Authority and Primary Care Trust Flu
Leads; the Health Protection Agency; clinical net-
works; and the public.
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The decision to activate the service was taken on the
basis of rising rates of ILI, coupled with information pro-
vided through close liaison with local public health ofﬁ-
cials, who were monitoring the pressure being
experienced by primary care services in each area of the
country. The decision to deactivate the service was taken
when ILI rates were approaching background levels, and
use of the service had diminished very substantially.
METHODS
Data from the telephone and Internet arms of the
service were captured on a single database. For every
patient who accessed the service, this recorded the date
and time of accessing the service; basic demographic
information (date of birth, sex); responses to each ques-
tion and, therefore, the outputs of the algorithm. These
data provided surveillance information during the pan-
demic in real time. Every collection of a course of anti-
viral medication was also recorded.
For comparison purposes, we also obtained data about
GP consultations for ILI. The RCGP has undertaken ILI
surveillance in GP for over 40 years. The system uses
around 100 sentinel GPs across England, covering a
population of approximately 800 000. It extracts
summary information (based on Read codes7) from GP
electronic records. This is used to estimate the rate of
ILI consultations in the population of England as a
whole.8 These estimates, by week of consultation, were
supplied by the RCGP Research and Surveillance
Centre. Based on these estimated rates, we estimated the
number of GP ILI consultations in the whole of England
by week and compared this to the number of NPFS con-
sultations by week.
Population sizes by age group were obtained from the
Ofﬁce for National Statistics estimates for mid-2009.9
Comparisons between groups were made using two-sided
t tests. The Exact method was used to calculate 95% CIs
for rate ratios (RR). Data were analysed in Excel 2011
and STATAV.12.1.
This analysis was part of an enhanced public health sur-
veillance programme during the pandemic. No explicit
ethical approval was required for data collection because it
had a statutory basis under the Health Service (Control of
Patient Information) Regulations SI1438/2002.
RESULTS
The NPFS was activated across England on 23 July 2009.
It remained operational for 204 days, until 10 February
Figure 1 Algorithm for telephone/Internet-based assessment.
Rutter P, Mytton O, Ellis B, et al. BMJ Open 2014;4:e004174. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2013-004174 3
Open Access
2010. During this time, it received 2.73 million unique
patient contacts (5200 contacts/100 000 population).
Contacts occurred in two clear waves (ﬁgure 2). The
ﬁrst was short, covering June and July 2009. The second
was more prolonged between September and December
2009. The rate of NPFS contacts at the peak of the ﬁrst
wave was more than three times higher than in the
second wave (135 vs 38 consultations/100 000 popula-
tion/day, RR 3.59, 95% CI 3.53 to 3.65).
Over the same period, there were just 429 000 GP con-
sultations related to ILI in England (827 consultations/
100 000 population). These also occurred in two waves
(ﬁgure 2). NPFS contacts exceeded GP consultations by
a factor of almost six (RR=5.76, 95% CI 5.72 to 5.80).
The difference was most marked in the service’s second
week of operation (748 vs 41.1 consultations/100 000
population/week, RR=18.2, 95% CI 17.6 to 18.9) and
subsequently diminished over time.
The number of GP consultations related to inﬂuenza-
like illness had been rising sharply in June and early July
2009, before the NPFS was activated. In the week begin-
ning, 13 July 2009, there were 154 GP consultations/
100 000 population/week (80 000 consultations in total).
During the subsequent week, the NPFS was activated and
Figure 2 Weekly rates of general practice (GP) consultations with influenza-like illness and National Pandemic Flu Service
consultations, by week, in England, April 2009–February 2010.
Figure 3 Daily mean contacts per hour to each arm of the National Pandemic Flu Service.
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the number of GP consultations fell to 133/100 000
people/week (69 000 consultations in total).
Just over half of patients (1 305 902/2 488 504; 53%)
used the Internet service arm; the remainder used the
telephone. Each method had distinct daily usage pat-
terns (ﬁgure 3). Usage of both peaked between 9:00
and 10:00. Just under one-quarter (22%; 279 150/1 250
184) of telephone contacts happened at other times.
Usage of the Internet-based service was more evenly
spread throughout the day. Just under half of its usage
was outside ‘9–5’ h (43%, 639 684/1 482 404). In total,
an average of 13 500 assessments were completed per
day. The mean daily volume of assessments was higher
during the week than at the weekend (14 600 vs 10 600,
p<0.0001).
Of the 2.73 million contacts with the NPFS, 9%
(n=244 078, ﬁgure 4) were immediately diverted
because they related to a child aged under 1 year, a
pregnant woman with respiratory disease or because
the patient described features of a potential medical
emergency. The remaining patients entered the full
assessment process. Almost three-quarters of these (1
807 866/2 488 510; 73%) received authorisation to
collect a course of antiviral medication. Most did subse-
quently collect this, although a substantial minority did
not (n=646 709; 36%).
Figure 4 Patient assessment by the National Pandemic Flu Service (204 days, July 2009–February 2010).
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The algorithm determined that almost two-thirds of
patients (n=1 537 178; 62%) did not require further
assessment by a clinician. These patients received self-
care advice. The remainder were advised to seek
in-person medical assessment (n=951 332; 38%), the
form of which depended on its indication (ﬁgure 4).
Use of the NPFS varied demographically (table 1).
Women used it more than men (52.6 vs 43.4 assess-
ments/1000 population, RR 1.21, 95% CI 1.21 to 1.22),
but men appeared to show a greater preference than
women for the NPFS relative to visiting their GP (ratio
of NPFS:RCGP 6.1 for men vs 5.6 for women, table 2).
Use declined with age: the assessment rate was seven
times greater among 16–29-year-olds than among the
over-65s (74.4 vs 9.9 assessments/1000 population, RR
7.46, 95% CI 7.41 to 7.52). Preferential use of the NPFS
rather than GP was particularly high among the young
and middle-aged (table 2).
Men were offered antiviral medication slightly more
often than women (74% for men vs 72% for women,
χ2=1812, p<0.0001). Antiviral medication authorisations
were highest for the age group between 1 and 15 years
(78%, table 1), generally reduced with age (χ2=6.1×105,
p<0.0001) and were lowest for the over-65s (59%).
Of those eligible to collect a course of antiviral medi-
cation, just under two-thirds did so (1 161 156/1 807
866; 64%). Those aged 16–29 years were the least likely
to collect their medication (317 155/528 211; 60%) and
those aged 65 years and over the most likely (36 182/
49 152; 74%). When a child aged between 1 and
15 years was deemed eligible for antiviral medication,
this medication was collected in 64% of cases.
Men were slightly more likely than women to access
the service via the Internet rather than telephone (53%
vs 52%, χ2=288.61, p<0.0001) but variation between age
groups was greater (ﬁgure 5). Young adults were more
likely to opt for Internet-based access (25–44 years,
59%) and the oldest group least likely to do so (75 years
and over, 28%, RR 2.1 95% CI 2.0 to 2.1).
DISCUSSION
The National Pandemic Flu Service was designed, in
advance of the pandemic, to prevent the NHS being over-
whelmed by people seeking medical advice and treatment
of ‘ﬂu-like’ symptoms due to heightened public awareness
and concern. By providing antiviral medication to ‘ﬂu
friends’ at distribution centres, it was intended to enable
the sick to stay at home and thereby reduce the spread of
infection. It was planned to quickly provide antiviral medi-
cation to those who might beneﬁt from it.
When the pandemic came and this new service was
activated, the population proved very willing to use it.
The service dealt with a high volume of contacts, asses-
sing 2.7 million patients in less than 7 months. It distrib-
uted antiviral medication to over one million people. We
suggest that its activation and use in the 2009–2010 pan-
demic provides successful proof-of-concept for this
approach.
A strength of this article is that it uses data on all
patients who accessed the service. A weakness, because
of the nature of the service, is that the information was
reported by patients and was not clinically validated.
Apart from the incident reporting systems described
later, there are no patient follow-up data to assess out-
comes or conﬁrm underlying diagnoses. Results of
microbiological sampling of patients who used the
service have been published elsewhere.6 Also, our esti-
mates for GP consultations are based on the RCGP senti-
nel surveillance system. Owing to the nature of sampling
this may not accurately reﬂect the true picture across
England.
Table 1 National Pandemic Flu Service (NPFS) assessments, authorisations for antiviral medication and actual collections
of antiviral medication
Population
(thousands)
Assessments
(thousands)
Courses of
antiviral
medication
authorised
(thousands)
Courses of
antiviral
medication
collected
(thousands)
NPFS
assessment
rate
(assessments/
1000
population
Authorised
to receive
antiviral
medication
(%)
Collected
antiviral
medication
once
authorised
(%)
All 51 810 2489 1808 1161 48.0 73 64
Sex
Male 25 515 1106 819 529 43.4 74 65
Female 26 295 1382 989 632 52.6 72 64
Age (years)
1–15 9041 637 495 318 70.4 78 64
16–29 9749 725 528 317 74.4 73 60
30–44 10 874 621 437 281 57.1 70 64
45–59 9941 356 255 177 35.8 71 70
60–64 3107 65 43.2 31.6 21.0 66 73
65 and over 8435 84 49.2 36.2 9.9 59 74
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SERVICE OPERATION
The cost of developing and maintaining the NPFS was
the main infrastructure-related expenditure associated
with the country’s pandemic preparedness and response.
The total cost of infrastructure in the UK (including
some non-NPFS costs) was £27.7 million during the pre-
paredness phase and £65.7 million during the response
phase.4
Although the telephone service was established at rela-
tively short notice, a great deal of planning had
occurred during an extended prepandemic period. The
government contracted with an existing telephone triage
service that was experienced in training temporary staff
to use health-related algorithms and was able to scale
service provision up and down according to demand.
The UK had a regular direct telephone and email
service for health consultations called NHS Direct. The
telephone service handled around ﬁve million calls each
year and around ﬁve million people used the online
symptom checker. Prior to the opening of the NPFS,
some patients were contacting NHS Direct.6 10 The pro-
portion of calls to NHS Direct that were triaged using
the cold/ﬂu algorithm rose steadily during June and
July, matching the rise in general practitioner consulta-
tions. Outside the ‘ﬂu season’ the proportion is typically
less than 2%. This proportion peaked at 35% on 14 July,
likely equivalent to around 4000–6000 daily calls (or 8–
12 calls/100 000). This is substantially lower than peak
NPFS usage when it ﬁrst opened (over 130 assessments/
100 000/day, around half of which were by phone). The
greater propensity to contact the NPFS may be because
of its ability to provide access to antiviral medication
(which NHS Direct was not), or because it was speciﬁc-
ally advertised in relation to the pandemic.
Table 2 Comparison of GP consultation and NPFS assessment rates
Population
(thousands)
GP
consultation
rate (per
thousand)
NPFS
assessment
rate (per
thousand)
GP
consultations
(thousands)
NPFS
assessments
(thousands)
Ratio of NPFS
assessments to GP
consultations
All 51 810 8.3 48.0 429 2489 5.8
Sex
Male 25 515 7.1 43.4 181 1106 6.1
Female 26 295 9.4 52.6 247 1382 5.6
Age (years)
0–14 9076 11.4 104
(1–15) 9041 70.4 637 6.1
15–44 21 252 10.3 218
(16–44) 20 623 65.3 1346 6.2
45–64 13 048 6.5 32.3 84 421 5.0
65 and over 8435 3.4 9.9 28 84 3.0
Figure 5 Use of the Internet-based arm of the National Pandemic Flu Service as a percentage of Internet-based and
telephone-based use, by population group.
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IMPACT ON PRIMARY CARE WORKLOAD
The NPFS was activated after the GP consultation rate for
ILI had risen for 7 weeks, and had doubled over the previ-
ous week. The weekly rate had risen to over 150 consulta-
tions/100 000 population. Although not as high as in
previous inﬂuenza pandemics, this was the highest level
experienced in England in a decade of ‘ﬂu seasons’.
Moreover, the consultation rate was 5–10-fold higher than
the national average in some areas of the country,6 causing
huge pressure on primary care services in some areas.
The GP consultation rate fell in the week that the
NPFS was activated (week beginning 20 July 2009), and
again in its second week. We cannot conclusively attri-
bute this to the introduction of the NPFS. Other mea-
sures suggest that inﬂuenza activity may have peaked at
around the same time: hospital admissions (week begin-
ning 20 July), critical care admissions (week beginning
27 July), deaths (week beginning 27 July) and Google
searches for inﬂuenza (week beginning 27 July).11
However, the fall in GP consultations was far more pro-
nounced than the fall in these other measures. The
clear impression from general practitioners is that the
service played an important role in reducing pressure
on GP at a very busy time.4 12
COMPARISON WITH OTHER UK COUNTRIES
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland chose not to be
part of the NPFS. Comparisons with these countries may
give an insight into the effect of the NPFS in reducing
GP consultations. While there are important geograph-
ical differences between the countries their health
systems, although separate, are broadly comparable.
Wales and Northern Ireland had a similar experience to
England. Wales had a summer peak (92.8 consultations/
100 000 population) in the same week as England (week
beginning 20 July), followed by a sustained second wave in
the autumn (peaking at 66.2 consultations/100 000 in the
week beginning 12 October).6 In terms of GP consulta-
tions, the ratio between the summer and autumn peaks
was 1.4 in Wales compared with 3.8 in England. This may
suggest that the NPFS succeeded, in England, in reducing
GP consultations during the second wave.
Northern Ireland also experienced two waves. The
peak of the ﬁrst wave was later than in England and
Wales (week beginning 27 July). Unlike in England and
Wales, the second wave had a higher peak than the ﬁrst
wave. This too might suggest that the NPFS in England
played a role in keeping GP consultations low in the
second wave. Wales is arguably a better epidemiological
comparator than Northern Ireland, because Wales and
England adjoin whereas Northern Ireland and England
are on separate islands.
The Scottish experience was very different. In
Scotland, there was no summer peak in GP consulta-
tions. As in the other UK countries, there was a sus-
tained autumn wave that peaked in October. The
absence of a summer peak in Scotland may partly be
explained by the earlier closure of the schools for
summer holidays.6 Because the trajectory of the ‘ﬂu’
pandemic appeared very different in Scotland, it is not
appropriate to make comparisons with England.
Differences between the four nations in the pressure
created by the pandemic were apparent from an early
stage. In England, there was marked pressure on
primary care, particularly in London and the West
Midlands. By contrast, the pressure on primary care in
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland was less intense.
It was for these reasons that England chose to use the
NPFS, while the other nations continued to rely purely
on their usual primary care systems.4
TELEPHONE AND INTERNET USE IN THE NHS
In the UK, most households have Internet access, and
more than two-thirds seek health information online.13
Telephone consultations have been available throughout
England since the launch of NHS Direct in 1998. Staffed
by nurses and health advisors, this system handled over
four million calls per year, and its website received 10
million hits. NHS Direct was shown to reduce demand
on out-of-hours GP services.14 Its scale and electronic
medical records also made it useful for surveillance,15 16
including inﬂuenza surveillance.17 18 Subsequently, in
2013, NHS Direct was replaced by NHS 111, another
telephone and Internet-based service.
The NPFS was launched to a public that has become
increasingly familiar with seeking medical help and
information by phone and through Internet, as it does
in many other aspects of life. But the NPFS was the ﬁrst
system in England—and, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst
national system in the world—in which non-medically
trained lay people acted as the primary interface with
patients, working to a standard algorithm and providing
a drug that normally requires medical prescription, as
deemed appropriate.
THE RISKS OF ALGORITHM-BASED CARE
During the service’s operation, concerns were raised about
the possibility of misdiagnoses, particularly that led to
serious illness being missed.19 20 The number of such inci-
dents that were reported was small. The NPSA was
informed of 72 incidents. By comparison, it was informed
of 2410 incidents pertaining to pandemic-related health-
care as a whole. The Agency reviewed the most serious 186
of these 2410 incidents in detail. Only one serious incident
was found to be related to a delay in diagnosis following
use of the NPFS—that is one patient in 2.7 million who
accessed the service. Diagnostic error, including delayed
diagnosis, is a common problem within conventional
systems of assessment and management.21 22
The RCGP concluded that “the ﬁrst mass application
of non-clinical-based triage appears to have been a quali-
ﬁed success story”, and recommended amendments for
future pandemics, based on the 2009 experience.23
A Department of Health evaluation set out speciﬁc
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details of problems encountered, and also laid out modi-
ﬁcations to planned NPFS use in future pandemic
plans.24
PATTERNS OF USAGE
The highest NPFS usage rate was seen among those
aged 16–29 years. The rate then decreased with age, and
was also lower among children. The decrease with age
among adults is consistent with the pattern of GP con-
sultations and hospital admissions.11 However, the mag-
nitude of this relationship was greater for the NPFS than
it was for GP. The NPFS usage rate fell by a factor of ﬁve
between the ages of 44 and 65 years. The GP consult-
ation rate fell by a factor of 3. This suggests that younger
people preferred newer, more immediate ways of acces-
sing the NHS while older people preferred the familiar-
ity of their general practitioner. It may also be because
older people have comorbid conditions, and therefore
felt that they needed a face-to-face consultation with a
doctor. The preferential use of the NPFS by young and
middle-aged people may suggest that the system has
value as a surveillance tool in those age groups.
The relatively low NPFS usage rate for children
despite the high incidence of inﬂuenza among children6
may reﬂect a lack of awareness that parents could use
the NPFS on behalf of their children or a parental pref-
erence to access usual medical care for their children.
One-third of those authorised to receive antiviral
drugs through the NPFS did not subsequently collect
this prescription. Collection rates for drugs prescribed
by a general practitioner in England are far higher than
this (97% of drugs prescribed for infections are col-
lected25), although other authors have also shown that
around 30–50% of patients with a long-term condition
are non-compliant with medication.26 However, in the
case of the NPFS it is perhaps inevitable that a propor-
tion of users of the service chose found that a self-
limiting illness was running its course and so did not
follow through with treatment.
There is a notable difference between the number of
people who were advised by the NPFS to seek further
medical attention and the number of people who did
so. The service advised 1.2 million people to see their
general practitioner. As we have reported elsewhere,11
there were a total of 580 000 GP consultations relating to
ILI during the pandemic. Although some patients may
have attended hospital emergency departments, this
strongly suggests that a large number of the 1.2 million
patients advised to seek further medical attention did
not do so. Further research is required to understand
the full scale of this, the reasons for this and the implica-
tions of it.
WIDESPREAD USE OF ANTIVIRAL MEDICATION
The NPFS made antiviral medication available to a large
number of people with ILI, without the need to consult
a medical practitioner. The number of such
prescriptions made through the NPFS (1 161 157)
dwarfed the number dispensed by community pharma-
cists on the prescription of a general practitioner
(10 610 from June 2009 to February 2010).11 It seems
unlikely that such high availability of prescription anti-
viral medication could have been achieved using the
general practitioner system alone without this causing
very severe disruption.
Criticism of heavy use of antiviral medication centres on
concerns about antiviral resistance from their ‘unnecessary’
use in what was perceived as a relatively mild inﬂuenza syn-
drome. While a small number (45) of antiviral-resistant
cases were reported,6 there was no evidence of sustained
person-to-person transmission of antiviral-resistant strains in
the UK despite extensive testing and monitoring.27 28 And
while it is correct that case fatality rates were lower than in
previous inﬂuenza pandemics,29 there were many cases of
severe illness requiring intensive care30 and 70 children in
England died.31
It has also been noted that the positivity rate among
those authorised to collect antivirals by the NPFS were
just over 30% in adults and just over 50% in children
(although children were only sampled after the peak of
the second wave). However, these rates were very similar
(after age-adjustment) to the positivity rates among GP
ILI consultations.6 In addition, the NPFS sampling
scheme relied on nasal swabs taken by the patient
without clinical supervision, rather than sputum or naso-
pharyngeal aspirates which have higher positivity rates.32
The stated NPFS positivity rates may, therefore, under-
estimate the true incidence of infection.
In the ﬁrst pandemic of modern times when a prevac-
cine protective option was available in the early stages of
the pandemic, we would argue that it was right to allow
wide access to it, and that more deaths of young people
and higher levels of serious complications were poten-
tially prevented.
The NPFS gave patients a rapid access to antiviral
medication, facilitating early use. Early use is thought to
be critical for reducing illness severity and intensity in
the individual.33 Also, the widespread use of antiviral
medication in the community, alongside other measures,
may have contributed to limiting the burden of inﬂu-
enza, particularly in the second wave.34 Antiviral medica-
tion may reduce transmission of the virus,34 particularly
among children,35 and widespread use at a population
level might reduce the overall attack rate.36 In facilitating
widespread early treatment, the NPFS may have contrib-
uted to preventing adverse outcomes, such as hospital-
isation, critical care admission and death.33 37
CONCLUSION
A total of 2.7 million people accessed the NPFS by tele-
phone or Internet. They received advice and, in two-thirds
of cases, authorisation to collect antiviral medication. The
service seemed to appeal particularly to younger patients.
Pressure on primary care fell dramatically after its
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introduction, although this cannot wholly be attributed to
the service. Together with the formal evaluation and
review of safety data, the experiences presented here offer
evidence of the feasibility of rapid, national implementa-
tion of a telephone-based and Internet-based triage and
antiviral authorisation service, based on non-clinically
trained operators following deﬁned algorithms. With
further reﬁnement, England can use this in future pan-
demics (which could be of much greater severity). Other
countries may wish to adopt a similar system as part of
their pandemic emergency planning.
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